About Paul Bezerra
Paul's disseration asks: under what conditions will bilateral aid donors experience greater strategic aid effectiveness? To answer this question, I develop a framework for understanding when bilateral donors – in the context of an increasingly competitive aid-for-policy “marketplace” – will experience greater foreign policy cooperation as a result of their own decision-making and policy processes. This relationship, however, is conditioned by different facets of each element of the aid-for-policy exchange: 1) the donor; 2) the recipient; and 3) the aid itself. In developing this argument, the donor-recipient aid and cooperation framework draws upon theories from international relations, foreign policy decision-making, public policy, and organization theory. Overall, I find elements related to the donor and the recipient condition strategic aid effectiveness. The results indicate donors who possess dependence-based power advantages, or higher levels of mutual dependence, with their recipients experience improved foreign policy cooperation, but this experience substantively varies across different levels of aid giving. Additionally, some donors – due to their power status, regime type, or normative adherences – experience more cooperation than others as a result of lower decision costs and institutional costs in their policy processes. The third element of the donor-recipient aid and cooperation framework, the aid itself, is left for analysis in future work.
To date, Paul's work has been published in Foreign Policy Analysis, International Interactions, International Studies Review, and Public Choice. Paul has also published in the Oxford Encyclopedia of Empirical International Relations Theory, and is finalizing a significant update to the Militarized Interstate Dispute Location Dataset (MIDLOC). Paul received an MA and MPA from Seton Hall University, and a BA from San Diego State University.